

Accounting Rules, Trading Incentives, and Systemic Risk

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Based on the following papers, with A. Ellul, C. Lundblad, and Y. Wang

“Is Historical Cost Accounting a Panacea? Market Stress, Incentive Distortions, and Gains Trading” *Journal of Finance* (2015)

“Mark-to-Market Accounting and Systemic Risk: Evidence from the Insurance industry” *Economic Policy* (2014)

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Research Motivation

- The recent crisis has revived major policy debates on **[A] accounting rules (MTM vs. HCA)** and **[B] risk-based capital regulations**.
 - We study how **trading incentives** generated by **[A] x [B]** may affect systemic risk? Both **before** and during **a crisis**.
- Why important? ABA's letter to SEC:

“The problems that exist in today's financial markets ... One factor that ... exacerbated these problems is fair value accounting.”
- U.S. Congress and European Commission also moved to **modify/suspend MTM**.

Usual Wisdom

- Consider an insurer that invests heavily in ABS.
- During the crisis of 2007-9, many ABS were severely downgraded → increased regulatory capital → lower risk-based capital ratio (RBC ratio).

$$\text{RBC Ratio} \downarrow = \frac{\text{Statutory Capital}}{(\text{Required}) \text{ Risk-Based Capital} \uparrow}$$

- Under **MTM**: Statutory Capital ↓ → RBC Ratio ↓↓
 - Since all price decline has been reflected, the insurer has incentives to **sell downgraded ABS** to restore the RBC ratio.
 - This leads to fire sales and downward spiral in ABS prices.
 - And, ... **systemic risk**.

This usual wisdom is only one side of a much more complex picture. Both MTM and HCA affect trading incentives both during and before the crisis.

$$\text{RBC Ratio} \downarrow = \frac{\text{Statutory Capital}}{(\text{Required}) \text{ Risk-Based Capital} \uparrow}$$

	MTM	HCA
Crisis	<p>Price declines already reflected in statutory capital</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Selling troubled assets helps <i>reduce required capital</i>. → Fire sales depress prices, further decreasing capital. → Selling even more ... → <u>Downward spiral in prices of troubled assets.</u> 	<p>Price declines yet to hit capital</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Less likely to sell troubled assets to avoid realizing losses. → Selling other assets helps realize gains, <i>increasing capital</i>. → Less negative effects on prices, but may <u>spread shocks to unrelated assets.</u>
Normal time	<p>Internalizing probability of fire sales leads to more <u>prudent portfolios</u>.</p>	<p>Knowing they have flexibility to avoid losses during crisis leads to more <u>aggressive risk taking</u>.</p>

Data

Our identification relies on the cross section of insurers:


- 1,961 life and P&C insurers during 2004-2010.
 - Financial information, year-end positions (corporate bonds, ABS, etc.), and daily trading activities from NAIC and Weiss Ratings.
- For each position, insurers provide information on its fair value and book-adjusted carrying value:
 - **MTM: Carrying value = Fair value**
 - **HCA: Carrying value \neq Fair value**
 - Unrealized gains = Fair value – Carrying value
- Ratings and other characteristics of ABS from Ratings Iquery and corporate bonds from Mergent FISD.

Identification

- 1. **Between-Insurance-Type**: Life as insurers using HCA vs. P&C as insurers using MTM. By regulation,
 - **Life** insurers only have to MTM securities in **NAIC/SVO class 6**, i.e. “in or near default”
 - **P&C** insurers have to MTM securities in **NAIC/SVO classes 3-6**, i.e. all “speculative-grade”
 - Unclean as life and P&C insurers may differ on many dimensions.
- 2. Within-Type**: Insurers are regulated at the state level.
 - Group states into **low vs. high MTM groups** for each insurance type based on discretion given to regulators.
 - Average MTM frequencies are **1% vs. 7%** for the low vs. high MTM **life** insurers and **31% vs. 55%** for the low vs. high MTM **P&C** insurers.
 - Results are robust across both identification strategies.

Crisis

Significant downgrades of ABS during the crisis...



Significant differences between life and P&C in % of **speculative-grade ABS that are MTM and sold.**

	Life			Property and Casualty		
	HCA	Revalued	Sold	HCA	Revalued	Sold
<u>All downgrades in the fourth quarter</u>						
** Investment to non-investment	74%	14%	13%	20%	60%	20%
** AAA to non-investment	79%	10%	11%	16%	63%	20%

Multivariate logit confirms that P&C insurers are significantly more likely to fire-sell downgraded ABS.

**** During crisis, MTM → Fire sales of troubled assets.**

Gains trading, i.e. targeted selling of (non-troubled) assets to realize gains, is **widespread among life insurers**.

	Life		P&C		All
	(3)	(4)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	All	All	All	All	All
(1) Unrealized gain pct.	-0.023*** (0.004)	-0.027*** (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.027*** (0.005)
(1) x Low RBC ratio dummy		0.003 (0.004)		-0.001 (0.011)	0.003 (0.005)
(1) x P&C dummy					0.023*** (0.008)
Crisis dummy x (1)	0.043*** (0.010)	0.035*** (0.010)	0.017 (0.013)	0.012 (0.015)	0.035*** (0.010)
Crisis dummy x (1) x Low RBC ratio dummy		0.021* (0.012)		0.028* (0.016)	0.022** (0.011)
Crisis dummy x (1) x P&C dummy					-0.023** (0.011)

**** During crisis, HCA → Gains trading.**

MTM:

Merrill et al. (2014) show that **fire sales of RMBS** generate about 20% price decline during the crisis.

HCA:

We find that **gains trading** decrease targeted bonds' prices by about 1-4% but these effects may spread more broadly.



Considering the crisis alone and focusing only on asset price effects, it appears that **MTM may lead to higher systemic risk.**

Pre-Crisis

- **Pre-crisis:** P&C insurers show more prudent allocations, increasing allocation to ABS and speculative-grade bonds less than life insurers.
- **Crisis:** P&C insurers cut down ABS and speculative-grade bonds more aggressively than life insurers.

	Allocation change 2004 to 2007 (Pre-Crisis)				Allocation change 2007 to 2010 (Crisis)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Stock	Spec.-grade bonds	ABS	Inv.-grade bonds	Stock	Spec.-grade bonds	ABS	Inv.-grade bonds
<i>Panel A: All insurance firms</i>								
P&C dummy	0.371 (0.767)	-0.361*** (0.118)	-2.041** (0.838)	5.950*** (1.197)	0.769 (0.575)	-0.605*** (0.215)	-2.656*** (0.504)	2.887** (1.183)
RBC ratio difference	0.082 (0.111)	0.033 (0.036)	-0.547** (0.242)	0.727** (0.293)	0.166 (0.162)	-0.230* (0.119)	-0.683*** (0.248)	0.326 (0.311)
RBC ratio	-0.052 (0.034)	-0.000 (0.005)	0.066 (0.056)	0.096 (0.076)	-0.054 (0.034)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.033)	0.072 (0.083)
Observations	1,750	1,750	1,750	1,750	1,793	1,793	1,793	1,793
Adjusted R-squared	0.103	0.199	0.090	0.153	0.095	0.022	0.667	0.487


Use “**reaching for yields**” of Becker and Ivashina (2013) as a measure of regulatory capital arbitrage. For the same ratings, **life insurers** buy ABS and corporate bonds that have higher yields than P&C insurers.



	(2)	(3)
	All	All
P&C dummy	-0.150***	-0.121***
	(0.014)	(0.020)
RBC ratio difference		-0.013**
		(0.006)
RBC ratio		-0.002
		(0.002)
Bond controls	YES	YES
Firm controls	NO	YES
Calendar quarter fixed effects	YES	YES
Observations	48,192	47,849
Adjusted R-squared	0.285	0.287

- It turns out that ABS/bonds with higher yields ex-ante significantly underperform during the crisis.
- **MTM** → Less “reaching for yields” ex-ante → Better performing portfolios ex-post!

Cumulative performance of A-AAA 2-5 year bond portfolio



Conclusions

- We use the insurance industry to investigate the effects of MTM on systemic risk:
 - Market prices do contain information and can serve as early warning signals.
 - Insurers using **MTM** engage **more in feedback trading** than insurers using HCA → **MTM exacerbates systemic events**.
 - Prior to the crisis, insurers using **MTM** engage **less in regulatory arbitrage** (reaching for yields) than insurers using HCA → **MTM decreases the buildup of systemic risk**.
- Net: Portfolios of insurers using MTM do not appear to perform worse during crisis. **Thus, MTM does not necessarily leads to higher systemic risk.**

Discussions

- **Key message:** The distortions engendered by MTM cannot be solved by simply replacing it with HCA.
 - Although HCA may solve a fire-sale feedback problem, HCA generates ex-ante incentives for excessive risk taking and may spread shocks across (otherwise unrelated) asset classes.
- To address the problem of systemic risk, a better way may be to alter the regulatory capital system.
 - Micro- vs. macro-prudential considerations.
 - Ex-ante vs. ex-post incentives.
 - **Caution:** Dangerous to assume that market price movements are not informative and are temporary, and systemic risk is simply about liquidity.